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Abstract: Values, legal consciousness and law
This thesis deals with legal values  and their importance for the decision making of legal 
subjects. First it  introduces a general model of a world, which can be used for any world with 
consistent effects. From that it deduces what can be considered an individual person and how such 
individuals behave. Who we consider an individual is dependent on our subjective choice. While 
choosing a particular individual we can express their relationship to their environment with a certain 
attitude  of  thought.  If  mutually  corresponding  thought  attitudes  can  be  shared  by  different 
individuals in such a way that the conveyance of them would correspond to a certain thought of a 
different individual, we use the term institution.
Institutions are not considered to be existing objectively,  however  they help us interpret 
objective facts. Institutions include natural and artificial persons, the state and the law. The state 
emerges  in  a  power  struggle,  although  under  the  influence  of  morality.  Morality  is  a  type of 
institution, which is created by an interaction among individuals and through a compromise between 
their aspirations. This thesis decides for a consequentialist approach to morality, while objections 
against  consequentialism  are  either  refuted  or  shown  to  be  able  to  be  assimilated  into 
consequentialism.
Furthermore it is shown, that it is impossible to objectively state, who should be considered 
a legal person, because the choice of personality is necessarily dependent upon relationships among 
individuals.  Considering  a  closer  connection  of  natural  persons  to  these  relationships  and their 
interest being an object of these relationships, artificial persons are only a tool for a fulfillment of 
their interests. That is why power relationships do not change as a result of an existence of artificial 
persons.
Individuals do not necessarily have to have equal rights and obligations, at least these follow 
neither from the structure of the world nor from derived moral rules. All things considered, reasons 
for  an  existence  of  various  rights  and  obligations  of  individuals  do  not  generally  contradict a 
consequentialist attitude.  This thesis focuses more on basic principles that define rights and value 
attitudes.
